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I. Introduction  
A positive relationship between defence spending and economic growth may be finding in 
the developing countries which may be due to the fact that military spending provides 
peaceful environment for investment and production activities to domestic and foreign 
investors. Further, it contributes to economic growth by engaging resources, particularly 
population, in research and development activities, providing technical skills, educational 
training and generating a necessary infrastructure for sustained level of economic 
development [see Benoit (1978), Babin (1986), Atesoglu and Mueller (1990), Stewart 
(1991), Mueller and Atesoglu (1993), Sezgin (2001),  Halicioglu, (2003, 2004) and latter on 
Wijeweera and Webb (2009) etc]. However, a negative relationship between defence 
spending and economic growth might occur due to the fact that it crowd-outs private 
investment by distorting resource allocation and diverting resources from productive 
ventures to unproductive activities [Mintz and Huang (1990), Ward and Davis (1992), 
Atesoglu (2002), Klein (2004), Kentor and Kick (2008) and Shahbaz et al. (2011) etc]. 
 
There are, broadly, two groups of empirical research in the defense economics literature. 
The first group consists of those studies which used single regression equations in order to 
test the effect of military spending on economic growth. This single equation framework 
based models were based on either Neoclassical or Keynesian approaches. Neoclassical 
approach based studies includes such as Feder (1982), Ram (1986), Biswas and Ram 
(1986), Alexander (1990), Sezgin (1997) and Murdoch et al. (1997). Examples of 
Keynesian approach based studies include Smith (1980), Lim (1983), Faini et al. (1984), 
and Chletsos and Kollias (1995). The basic difference among these approaches is that the 
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Neoclassical models are particularly based on the supply-side (i.e. modernization positive 
externalities from infrastructure, technological spin-offs) whereas the Keynesian models are 
based on the demand-side (i.e., crowding-out of investment, exports, education, health). The 
Neoclassical or supply-side models include the work of Feder (1982), Ram (1986) and 
Biswas and Ram (1986), which is referred to as the Feder–Ram model while Keynesian or 
demand-side models are based on the work of Smith (1980).  
 
To overcome the problem of single equation by concentrating on the demand or supply-side 
only, models were developed in simultaneous equation framework with a Keynesian 
aggregate demand and supply-side function, in the form of a growth equation derived from 
aggregate production function. Those studies which use simultaneous equation models by 
incorporating both the demand and supply sides factors to investigate the effect of military 
spending on economic growth, forms the second group of empirical studies. These models 
are known as Deger-type models as these are based on the work of Deger and Smith (1983) 
and Deger (1986). However, from the empirical point of view, it appears that there is no 
clear-cut agreement among the researchers about the nature and extent of the growth effects 
of military spending. For instance, Halicioglu (2003, 2004) found positive impact of 
defence spending on real output for Turkish economy and same inference was drawn by 
Atesoglu, (2009) for US economy while Shahbaz et al. (2011) reported inverse effect of 
military spending on economic growth in case of Pakistan. Above discussion shows that 
defence literature provides inconclusive results on the relationship between military 
spending and economic growth in case country studies and is the main motivation for 
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researchers to probe the relationship between military spending and economic growth in 
case of India.  
 
The current study is a valuable contribution to existing literature for four main reasons. 
Firstly, the study probes the effect of military spending on economic growth using extended 
Keynesian model by incorporating trade openness as an exogenous variable for the period 
of 1971-2010 in case of India. Secondly, ARDL bounds testing approach is applied to 
examine cointegration among the variables which is not used in the existing literature on 
military spending and economic growth in case of India. Thirdly, the study uses two unit 
root tests containing information about structural breaks in the series in which one test uses 
endogenously determined one structural breaks and second test incorporates endogenously 
determined two structural breaks. Forth, we analyzed the nonlinearity in the defence 
spending and economic growth relationship and we also estimated the turning point after 
which effect of more defence spending becomes negative on economic growth in Indian 
economy.   
 
I.I. Indian Context 
Defence sector in developing countries like India is one of those sectors where major 
proportion of budget allocation is allocated every year. According to SIPRI Yearbook 2009, 
India’s military spending in 2008 was US$ 24,716 million, in constant 2005 price which 
ranks among the top 10 in the world. For example, in 1988 India’s total military spending 
was in 3.82% of GDP US$ which has increased to 2.97% of GDP in 2009. This implies that 
India spends a huge chunk of her income on military sector which might use scarce 
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resources and crowd out growth-leading spending such as health and education expenditures 
and also might stimulate economic growth by spin-off effects. In particular since the trade-
off takes place first and primarily at the government budgetary level, military spending may 
crowd-out other types of government spending which has direct and bigger productivity 
effects. Thus, there is a potential problem and trade-off between military security and 
human security. In addition, national security and protection of property rights are the sine 
qua non of economic development and without them no institutions can transform a poor 
country into a developed one.  
 
Another point is worth mentioning; this is derived from the recent literature on the success 
of ‘large’ economies in achieving high rates of growth in the era of globalization. Alesina et 
al. (2008) claimed that “there are economies of scale in the production of public goods. The 
per capita cost of many public goods is lower in larger countries, where taxpayers pay for 
them”. For example defence in case of a larger country (both in terms of population and 
national product) is less subjective to foreign aggression. Thus, safety is a public good that 
increases with country size. Also, and related to the size of government argument above, 
smaller countries may have to spend proportionately more for defence than larger countries 
given economies of scale in defence spending. This shows that a large country may derive 
economies of scale from defence spending which protects itself and provides security. This 
may be one explanatory factor behind the recent growth successes of large developing 
countries (often termed BRICS, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Yet, India 
seems to have suffered a lot due to high military spending which have been a substantial 
part of overall government spending that in turn has depleted resources from government 
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spending on health, education and infrastructure. Though, expenditure on the defence sector 
is treated as unproductive expenditure yet it is argued that it provides a number of 
opportunities of employment in India and hence contributes to growth process. However, 
from the policy perspective, it is very need to determine the channels by which defense 
spending affects economic growth process as the effect of defence spending on economic 
growth can be either positive or negative. Therefore, it opens new channels for the policy 
makers to apply different strategies to boost economic growth and development of the 
country in question. 
 
Military expenditure would have both positive and negative effects on economic growth in 
developing countries. Those effects could be direct and indirect. For example, military 
expenditure might stimulate India’s economic growth directly by the spin-off from defence 
to other sectors in the economy. India’s military expenditure also might reduce economic 
growth indirectly by depressing the savings ratio. Some major problems of India’s 
economic development such as a low savings ratio, severe deficits in balance of payment 
and lack of public expenditures on health might be deteriorated by the high military 
spending. So the third hypothesis is that India’s military spending has a net negative effect 
on economic growth by taking both direct and indirect effects together. 
 
The rest of study is organized as following: Section-II contains the review of literature on 
relationship between defence spending and economic growth. Modeling framework and 
data is explained in Section-III while Section-IV explains the estimation strategy. The 
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empirical evidence on relationship between defence spending and economic growth is 
discussed in Section-V and conclusions and policy implications are drawn in final Section.   
 
II. Literature Review 
There are number of studies trying to find an answer whether a rise in defence spending 
enhances growth process or not. We can classify these studies into those that find positive 
benefits and therefore support the Keynesian point of view, those that find negative benefits 
refuting the Keynesians and those that conclude there are insignificant linkages between 
defence spending and economic growth. The following is a short summary of some of the 
empirical defence literature that has emerged since the beginning of the last decade. 
Initially, Benoit (1978) analyzed the correlation for 44 less developed economies by 
concluding that defence spending has positive impact on economic growth. Latter on, Babin 
(1986) by using data from 88 developing countries probed relationship between both the 
variables and reported that military stability is an important precondition for economic 
advancement. Atesoglu and Mueller (1990) used a two sector Feder-Ram’s model for the 
US economy. They noted a positive effect from defence sector to civilian sector. 
 
Similarly, Stewart (1991) investigated Keynesian demand function to a group of LDCs. 
From empirical analysis, Stewart reported that defence and non-defence expenditures are 
positively linked with economic growth, however, the effect of non-defence spending is 
stronger. Ward et al. (1991) applied a three sector model developed by Feder-Ram with 
seperate externality and productivity effects for India. Their analysis revealed that defence 
spending has positive effect on economic growth. Apart from that, Mueller and Atesoglu 
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(1993) investigated the relationship between military spending and economic growth by 
incorporating technological change into a two sector Feder-Ram model for the US economy 
and noted a positive effect from defence spending to economic growth. In case of Turkey 
and Greece, Sezgin (2001) ran a regression to test the effect of military spending on 
economic growth. Their results showed that defence spending boosts the pace of economic 
growth both in long-and-short runs. Later on, Halicioglu, (2003, 2004) used Atesoglu 
(2002) model to analyze the impact of military spending on aggregate output and agreed 
with findings by Sezgin (2001) in case of Turkey. For Sri Lankan economy, Wijeweera and 
Webb, (2009) used Keynesian model to investigate relationship between military spending 
and economic growth in the presence of non-military expenditures and real interest. Their 
results indicated a positive effect of military spending on economic growth. Finally, Gupta 
et al. (2010) re-investigated the relationship between military expenditures and aggregate 
output for US economy. They applied factor augmented vector autoregressive (FAVAR) 
model and reported positive impact of military spending on aggregate output. In case of 
North Cyprus, Feridun et al. (2011) reported positive effect of defence expenditures on 
economic growth.   
 
In cross-country studies, Bose et al. (2003) chose a panel of thirty developing countries to 
test the association between defence spending and economic growth and found positive and 
significant effect from military expenditures to economic growth. Similarly, Yildirm et al. 
(2005) explored the relationship between military spending and economic growth for OECD 
countries using dynamic panel data approach. Their empirical analysis indicated that 
military spending stimulates aggregate output. Narayan and Singh (2007) investigated said 
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issue for Fiji Islands by incorporating exports as a new variable in production function 
within multivariate framework. They found that defence spending has positive impact on 
economic growth through exports-enhancing effect. A positive and significant effect of 
defence spending on economic growth was found by Ando (2008) using data for 109 
countries, including 30 OECD countries. 
 
On contrary, defence literature also provides studies which reported inverse impact of 
military spending on economic growth. For instance, Mintz and Huang (1990) used three 
equation models for the US economy and noted that a rise in defense spending is inversely 
linked with economic growth through investment-declining effect1. Ward and Davis (1992) 
re-investigated the relationship between defence spending and economic growth by using 
three sectors' Feder-Ram model in case of United States. Their empirical exercise revealed 
an inverse effect of military spending on economic growth through productivity-declining 
effect. Moreover, Atesoglu (2002) probed the role of military spending in economic 
performance of US economy by applying models developed by Romer, (2000) and Taylor, 
(2000). The empirical analysis found that a reduction in military spending improves the 
economic performance of United States in long run as well as in short run. In case of South 
Africa, Birdi and Dunne, (2002) investigated the relationship between military spending and 
economic growth using model developed by Feder-Ram and reported that a rise in military 
spending impedes the economic performance for short span of time with significant 
feedback affect. 
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In case of Peru, Klein (2004) conducted a study to investigate the impact of defence 
spending on economic growth and reported inverse effect of military spending on the pace 
of economic growth. Karagol and Palaz, (2004) re-examined the association between 
defence spending and economic growth for Turkish economy by using Johansen 
multivariate approach to cointegration. Their empirical evidence confirmed long run 
relationship between the variables and noted that a rise in military spending retards 
economic growth2. Kentor and Kick (2008) explored a new dimension of military spending, 
military expenditures per soldier, which captures the capital intensiveness of a country’s 
military organization on economic growth. The cross-national panel regression analysis 
indicated that rise in military spending per soldier inhibits the growth of per capita GDP and 
this effect is the most pronounced in least developed economies. Apart from that Smith and 
Tuttle (2008) probed the relationship between military spending and economic growth for 
US economy by applying Atesoglu (2002) model and found the absence of positive impact 
of military spending on economic growth. Tang (2008) tested the effect of military spending 
on economic growth in case of Malaysia and reported the inverse impact of rise in military 
spending on economic growth. In case of Pakistan, Shahbaz et al. (2011) reinvestigated the 
validation of Keynesian hypothesis regarding the relationship between military spending 
and economic growth. Their empirical evidence indicated that a rise in military spending 
retards the pace of economic growth. The granger causality analysis further confirmed that 
military spending inversely granger-caused economic growth.  
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In cross-country case studies, Cappelen et al. (1984) examined the effect of military 
expenditures on economic growth including manufacturing output and investment as 
exogenous variables in OECD countries. They found positive association between military 
spending and manufacturing sector output while inverse relation was reported between 
military spending and investment. Moreover, they concluded that overall effect of military 
spending is negative on economic growth for three sub-groups3. Galvin (2003) applied 
2SLS and 3SLS to investigate demand and supply side models for 64 LDCs. Results 
indicated that defence spending has negative effect on economic growth by declining public 
savings4. Abu-Bader and Abu-Quarn (2003) investigated the relationship between military 
spending, government non-military expenditures and economic growth for Egypt, Israel and 
Syria. Their analysis reported that military spending impedes economic growth. Moreover, 
Pieroni (2009) investigated the relationship between military spending and economic 
growth using cross-country data. Results showed that a rise in defence spending is retarding 
economic growth. Furthermore, Pieroni (2009) argued that relationship between military 
spending and economic growth may be non-linear and provide different results as compared 
to traditional approaches in defense literature. In a very recent study Wijeweera and Webb 
(2011) used a panel co-integration approach to examine the relationship between military 
spending and economic growth in the five South Asian countries (namely India, Pakistan, 
Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh) for the period of 1988–2007. Wijeweera and Webb 
(2011) found that a 1% increase in military spending increases real GDP by only 0.04% and 
hence they concluded that the substantial amount of public expenditure that is currently 
used for military purposes in these countries has a negligible impact upon economic growth.  
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III. Modeling, Methodological Framework and Data Collection  
The development of empirical research lead us to use Feder (1983) military spending model 
to test the relationship between military spending and economic growth in the presence of 
investment, interest rate and trade openness. Feder’s model was used by Ram (1986, 1995), 
Biswas and Ram (1986) and latter on, Ward et al. (1991) and Yildrin et al. (2005) 
investigated the effect of military spending on economic growth using Feder (1983) model. 
Romer (2000), Taylor (2000) and Atesoglu (2002, 2009) have examined the association 
between both the variables by replacing IS-LM and AD-AS models. We have transformed 
the series into natural logarithm. Simple linear specification provides inefficient and 
unreliable empirical results due to sharpness in time series in developing economies like 
India (Karagol, 2006). In such situation, use of log-linear specification is better option for 
time series analysis which directly produces elasticity. Also, log-linear specification 
provides better and unbiased empirical evidence (Sezgin, 2004). In the light of above 
discussion, our empirical equation is modeled as follows: 
 
tttttt TRKMG µααααα +++++= 54321ln  (1)                                                                 
 
Where tG   is real GDP per capita proxy for economic growth, tM  is for per capita military 
spending, tK indicates investment per capita, tR is real interest rate, tT is showing trade 
openness per capita and tµ is residual term is assumed to be normally distributed.  
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II.I: Unit root tests 
Traditional unit root tests such as ADF (Dicky and Fuller, 1979), P-P (Philip and Perron, 
1988) and DF-GLS (Elliot et al. 1996) are used to find out integrating order of the variables. 
However, these tests are argued to give misleading results when data series exhibits socks. 
Therefore, attempts have been made to develop test of unit root which incorporates presence 
of structural breaks in the null of the unit root hypothesis. The Perron’s (1989) unit root test 
in this regard is the first attempt. The Perron (1989) unit root test assumes that the structural 
break date is uncorrelated with the data and known ex ante by economic information: for 
example, the 1973 oil price shock. However, according to Christiano (1992), the Perron 
(1989)’s assumption of exogenous breaks has been criticized and considered inappropriate. 
Due to problems associated with “pre-testing”, Perron’s methodology invalidates the 
distribution theory of conventional testing and will tend to over reject the null of unit root. 
Instead, Zivot and Andrews (1992, hereafter ZA) treat the selection of the break points as 
the outcome of an estimation procedure. They transform Perron (1989)’s test into an 
unconditional unit root test which allows endogenously determined break points in the 
intercept and/or the trend function.  
 
Following Perron (1989)’s notation, ZA test the null of unit root against the alternative of a 
one-time structural break with three models: Model A allows a one-time change in the level 
of the series, Model B permits a one-time change in the slope of the trend function of the 
series and Model C admits both changes. The regression equations corresponding to these 
three models are as following. 
Model A: t
k
i
ititt ycDUyty εθαβµ +∆++++=∆ ∑
=
−−
1
1                 (2) 
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Model B: t
k
i
ititt ycDTyty εγαβµ +∆++++=∆ ∑
=
−−
1
1                   (3) 
Model C: t
k
i
itittt ycDTDUyty εγθαβµ +∆+++++=∆ ∑
=
−−
1
1       (4) 
 
where DUt and DTt are break dummy variables for a mean shift and a trend shift, 
respectively. The shift occurs at each possible break point )1( TTT BB << . Formally: 
 
and
otherwise
Ttif
DU Bt


 >
=
,0
,,1


 >−
=
otherwise
TtifTt
DT BBt
,0
,,
 
  
where k is the number of lags determined for each possible break point by one of 
information criteria. The null hypothesis is 0=α , which implies that the series exhibits a 
unit root with a drift and excludes any structural break points. The alternative hypothesis is 
0<α , which implies that the series is a trend-stationary with an unknown one-time break. 
So Equations (1), (2) and (3) are sequentially estimated and BT  is chosen so as to minimize 
the one sided t-statistics for testing 0ˆ =α  
 
Since some variables exhibit multiple break points, some test has been developed to 
incorporate multiple structural breaks in the data series. Lee and Strazicich (2003, 2004) test 
of unit root allows us to test for at most two endogenous break and uses the Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) test statistics. Let us consider the following data generating process (DGP): 
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,tt eZy += δ ttt ee εβ += −1
  (5) 
 
where tZ
 
is a vector of exogenous variables, δ
 
is a vector of parameters and tε
 
is a white 
noise process, such that ).,0(~ 2σε NIIDt  First we will consider the case when there is 
evidence of one structural break. The crash model that allows shift in level only is described 
by ],,,1[ tt DtZ = and the break model that allows for changes in both level and trend is 
described as ,]',,1[ ttt DTDtZ = where tD and tDT are two dummies defined as: 
ifDt ,1= 1+≥ BTt
 
      
otherwise,0=
 
and  
ifTtDT Bt ,−= 1+≥ BTt     otherwise,0=   
 
where TB is the time period of the break date. Next, let us consider the framework that 
allows for two structural breaks. The crash model that considers two shifts in level only is 
described by ],,,,1[ 21 ttt DDtZ = and the break model that allows for two changes in both 
level and trend is described as ],,,1[ 2211 ttttt DTDDTDtZ = where jtD and jtDT for j = 1, 2 are 
appropriate dummies defined as above, viz.,   
ifD jt ,1= 1+≥ BjTt
 
        
otherwise,0=
 
and  
ifTtDT Bjtj ,−= 1+≥ BjTt
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         otherwise,0=
 
where TBj is the jth break date. The main advantage of (Lee and Strazicich, 2003, 2004) 
approach to unit root test is that it allows for breaks under the null (β = 1) and alternative (β 
< 1) in the DGP given in equation (2). This method uses the following regression to obtain 
the LM unit root test statistics 
 
tjt
k
i
ittt uSSZy +∆++∆=∆ −
=
− ∑
~~
'
1
1 γφδ
 (6) 
 
 
where δδ ~;,...,2,~~~ TtZyS tttt =−Ψ−=  denotes the regression coefficient of ty∆ on tZ∆ and 
11 ,
~~ yZytt δ−=Ψ and 1Z being first observations of ty  and tZ  respectively. The lagged term 
jtS −∆
~
are included to correct for likely serial correlation in errors. Using the above equation, 
the null hypothesis of unit root test )0( =φ is tested by the LM t-statistics. The location of 
the structural break or structural breaks is determined by selecting all possible breaks for the 
minimum t-statistic as follows: 
 
),(~ln)(~ln λτλτ λ ff i =  where TTB /=λ . 
 
The search is carried out over the trimming region (0.15T, 0.85T), where T is sample size 
and TB denotes date of structural break. We determined the breaks where the endogenous 
two-break LM t-test statistic is at a minimum. The critical values are tabulated in Lee and 
Strazicich (2003, 2004) for the two-break and one-break cases respectively. To select the 
lag length (k) we use the ‘t-sig’ approach5 proposed by Hall (1994). This involves starting 
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with a predetermined upper bound k. If the last included lag is significant, k is chosen. 
However, if k is insignificant6, it is reduced by one lag until the last lag becomes significant. 
If no lags are significant k is set equal to zero. In the present study we have estimated a 
model which allows for endogenous determined structural breaks in intercept and trend 
jointly and we call this model as model CC.   
 
II.II ARDL cointegration approach 
For cointegration analysis the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds testing 
approach developed by Pesaran et al. (2001) is utilized between the variables in equation-1 
because of its numerous advantages over traditional techniques of cointegration. For 
example, first, it can be applied irrespective of whether the variables are integrated of order 
I(0) or integrated of order I(1); secondly, it has better properties for small sample data sets; 
thirdly, a dynamic error correction model (ECM) can be derived from the ARDL model 
through a simple linear transformation (Banerrjee and Newman, 1993) which integrates the 
short-run dynamics with the long-run equilibrium without losing information about long-
run. In our study we estimated following unrestricted error correction method (UECM) in 
ARDL framework: 
 
 
∑ ∑∑∑
∑
= =
−−
=
−
=
−
=
−−−−−−
+∆+∆+∆+∆+
∆++++++++=∆
n
n
n
n
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o
   (7) 
∑ ∑∑∑
∑
= =
−−
=
−
=
−
=
−−−−−−
+∆+∆+∆+∆+
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o
    (8) 
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  (11) 
 
Where 
o
α  and Tα is the drift component and time trend, and µ  is i.i.d. processes. In order 
to avoid problem of serial correlation in equation 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 optimal lag length of the 
first differenced regression is selected by Akaike Information Criteria (AIC). Pesaran et al. 
(2001) tabulated two critical bounds (upper and lower critical bounds) to take the decision 
about the existence of long-run relationship among the variables. The null hypothesis of no 
cointegration in equations i.e. (7-11) 0:0 ===== TRKMGH ααααα , 
0:0 ===== TRKMGH βββββ , 0:0 ===== TRKMGH δδδδδ , 0:0 ===== TRKMGH ϑϑϑϑϑ  
and 0:0 ===== TRKMGH γγγγγ  against alternative hypothesis of cointegration i.e. 
0:0 ≠≠≠≠≠ TRKMGH ααααα , 0:0 ≠≠≠≠≠ TRKMGH βββββ ,  0:0 ≠≠≠≠≠ TRKMGH δδδδδ , 
0:0 ≠≠≠≠≠ TRKMGH ϑϑϑϑϑ  and 0:0 ≠≠≠≠≠ TRKMGH γγγγγ  is tested by comparing the 
calculated F-statistic with LCB (lower critical bound) and UCB (upper critical bound) 
tabulated by Pesaran et al. (2001). If calculated value of F-statistic is more than upper 
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critical bound (UCB) then there is cointegration among the variables and if lower critical 
bound (LCB) is more than computed F-statistic then hypothesis of no cointegration may be 
accepted however, if calculated F-statistic is between lower and upper critical bounds then 
decision about cointegration is inconclusive.  
 
Now we moved to detect the direction of causal relationship between economic growth, 
military spending, investment, real interest and trade openness by applying standard 
Granger causality test augmented with a lagged error-correction term. Engle-Granger (1987) 
suggested that if there is cointegration relationship among the test variables there will be 
Granger causality in at least from one direction provided that the variables are integrated of 
order one or I(1). Engle-Granger (1987) cautioned that if the Granger causality test is 
conducted at first difference through vector auto regression (VAR) method then it will be 
misleading in the presence of cointegration. Therefore, the inclusion of an additional 
variable to the VAR method such as the error correction term would help us to capture the 
long-run relationship. Therefore, error correction term is incorporated in the augmented 
version of Granger causality test and it is formulated in a bi-variate pth order vector error-
correction model (VECM) which is as follows: 
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Where ∆  is the difference operator; 1−tECM  is the lagged error-correction term derived 
from the long-run cointegrating relationship and iiii 4321 ,,, µµµµ  and i5µ  are i.i.d process 
with mean zero and finite covariance matrix. The presence of a significant relationship in 
first differences of the variables provides evidence on the direction of the short-run 
causation while a significant t-statistic pertaining to the error correction term (ECM) 
proposes the presence of significant long-run causation. It is important to mention that the 
causality has to be interpreted in the Granger sense.  
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To test the goodness of fit of the ARDL model we conducted the diagnostic test by 
examining the problem of serial correlation, functional form, normality of error term and 
heteroscedisticity and the stability of the ARDL model is tested by applying the cumulative 
sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) and the cumulative sum of squares of recursive 
residuals (CUSUMSQ). 
 
The study covers the time period of 1971-2010. The data on real GDP per capita, military 
spending, investment, interest rate and trade openness has collected from World 
Development Indicators (WDI, CD-ROM, 2010).  
 
IV. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION 
In defence literature, researchers extensively used traditional unit root tests, for instance, 
ADF by Dicky and Fuller (1981), P-P by Philip and Perron (1988), DF-GLS by Elliot et al. 
(1996) and Ng-Perron by Ng-Perron (2001) etc to test the integrating orders of the 
macroeconomic variables. These tests provide spurious results due to their poor properties. It is 
pointed by Baum (2004) that empirical evidence on order of integration of the variable by ADF, 
P-P and DF-GLS is not reliable. These unit root tests do not have informations about structural 
break occurred in the series. In doing so, we have used Zivot-Andrews (1992) unit root test 
containing information about one structural break and Lee-Strazicich (2003) unit root test 
containing information about two structural breaks occurred in the series to test the order of 
integration of the variables. The results are reported in Table-1. 
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Table-1: Unit Root Estimation 
ZA test-statistic  
Model  G M K T R 
A -2.115 0.618 -3.566 -4.002 -5.608*** 
B -2.456 -0.279 -4.447** -3.389 -3.389 
C -2.450 -0.271 -4.577 -4.366 -4.366 
LS test 
CC -6.6155*** -11.8770*** -8.6494*** -5.9746** -5.0415 
ZA test-Critical values: 1%: -5.43 5%: -4.80 for model when breaks occur in intercept 
only; Critical values: 1%: -4.93 5%: -4.42 for model when breaks occur in trend only; 
Critical values: 1%: -5.57 5%: -5.08 for model when breaks occur in intercept and trend 
both;. TB1 and TB2 are the dates of the structural breaks; k is the lag length; Critical values 
of test statistics when breaks occur intercept and trend jointly are reported in Lee-
Strazicich (2003). Complete results of both tests will be available from the authors upon 
request. *** and ** denotes significance at 1% and 5% level of significance.  
 
It is evident from Table-1 that ZA test-statistic suggests that R is stationary at I(0) while rest 
of variables are integrated at I(1). The empirical evidence by LS test statistic (which 
incorporate two structural breaks and has relatively more power because of being LM type 
test) suggests that all variable are stationary at I(1) except R is integrated at I(0). This shows 
that variables in the model are integrated at mixed order of integration. In such 
circumstances, we apply ARDL bounds testing approach to cointegration to test the 
existence of long run relationship between the variables. However, before proceeding to two 
steps ARDL procedure, it is necessary to select appropriate lag length of variables for which 
we used Akaike Information Criteria (AIC)7. 
Table-2: Bounds Testing to Cointegration 
Estimated Models ),,,( ttttt RTKMfG =  ),,,( ttttt RTKGfM =  ),,,( ttttt RTMGfK =  ),,,( ttttt RKMGfT =  ),,,( ttttt TKMGfR =  
Optimal lag structure (2, 2, 1,2 , 1) (2, 1, 2, 1, 1) (2, 2, 1, 2, 1) (2, 1, 2, 1, 2) (2, 2, 2, 1, 2) 
F-statistics (Wald-Statistics) 7.1262** 5.424*** 7.831** 1.146 0.7957 
Critical values (T = 40)# Significant level Lower bounds, I(0) Upper bounds, I(1)    
1 per cent 7.527 8.803    
5 per cent 5.387 6.437    
10 per cent 4.447 5.420    
2R  0.8024 0.8537 0.8521 0.6696 0.5945 
Adjusted- 2R  0.5678 0.6989 0.6764 0.2773 0.0539 
F-statistics (Prob-value) 3.4209(0.0082)* 5.5142 (0.0004) 4.8518 (0.0012) 1.7069 (0.1422) 1.0998 (0.4322) 
Durbin-Watson 1.7015 2.1367 1.9564 2.1534 2.0619 
Note: The asterisk *, ** denote the significant at 1%, 5% level of significance. The optimal lag structure is determined by AIC. The probability values are given in parenthesis. # Critical 
values bounds computed by (Narayan, 2005) following unrestricted intercept and restricted trend. 
  
The empirical evidence indicates that calculated F-statistics are i.e. ),,,/( tttttG RTKMGF = = 7.1262, ),,,/( tttttM RTKGMF = = 
5.424 and ),,,/( tttttK RTGMKF = = 7.831 is more than upper critical bound i.e. 6.437 and 5.420  at 5%, 10% and 5% level of 
significance respectively, reported by Narayan (2005). This indicates that there are three cointegrating vectors that confirm the 
existence of long run relationship between economic growth, defence spending, investment, interest rate and trade openness for the 
period 1971-2010 in Indian context. The existence of long run relationship between the variables helps us to find out partial impacts of 
military spending and other control variables on economic growth. Results are reported in Table 3. 
Table-3: Long Run Results 
Dependent Variable = tGln  
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic Coefficient T-Statistic 
Constant 6.5559 128.0949* 6.5153 168.2397* 
tMln  0.0440 4.9592* 0.0884 4.7863* 
2ln tM  … … -0.0020 -1.7465*** 
tKln  0.1631 2.1200** 0.1406 2.5031** 
tTln  0.1036 4.2542* 0.0681 3.1850* 
tRln  -0.0659 -2.0886** … … 
Diagnostic Tests 
Test Statistics Prob. Statistics Prob. 
SquaredR −  0.9948  0.9954  
StatisticsF −  1601.319 (0.0001) 1786.714 (0.0000) 
NORMAL2χ  0.6430 (0.7250) 0.2379 (0.8878) 
SERIAL2χ  1.3933 (0.2633) 0.1544 (0.8575) 
ARCH2χ  1.3091 (0.2885) 0.19700 (0.6599) 
WHITE2χ  1.2480 (0.3094) 1.4002 0.2555 
REMSAY2χ  0.0592 (0.8091) 2.2167 0.1463 
Note: *, (**), *** indicate significant at 1%, (5%), 10% significance level 
respectively. 
Note: NORMAL2χ refers to the Jarque–Bera statistic of the test for normal residuals, SERIAL2χ  is the Breusch–Godfrey LM 
test statistic for no first-order serial correlation,  WHITE2χ denotes White’s test statistic to test for homoskedastic errors, and 
ARCH2χ is Engle’s test statistic is for no autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity.  REMSAY2χ  is model specification 
test. 
 
It is evident from Table-3 that current economic growth is positively affected by military spending (M), 
investment (K) and trade openness (T) while negatively by interest rate (R). It is concluded that a 1 
percent increase in M, K and T in current period will raise economic growth by 4.40, 16.31 and 10.36 
percent in the long run. This implies that an increase in defence spending increases economic growth in 
India might be through spin-off effect or it may be due to the fact that defence expenditure provides 
peaceful environment for investment and production activities to domestic and foreign investors or it 
might be contributing to economic growth of India by engaging resources, particularly population, in 
research and development activities, providing technical skills, educational training and generating an 
infrastructure necessary for economic development or might be due to combination of all the factors.  
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Similarly, increase in the domestic investment and trade openness enhances economic growth by 
providing basic infrastructure facilities, competitive environment and broader market. Although, the 
effect of defence spending on economic growth is positive and it is statistically significant but linear 
impact is minimal. To test the more robustness of the results we included the squared term of M in the 
model. The results show that nonlinear relationship between military spending and economic growth is 
inverted-U shaped. The coefficients of linear and non-linear terms are 0.0884 and -0.0020 respectively.  
This shows that a rise in military spending stimulates economic growth initially and declines it as 
economy reaches to maturity while threshold point is 36.59. Moreover, lower portion of Table-3 
reflects that long run model passes all diagnostic tests against serial correlation, autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedisticity, non-normality of residual term, white heteroscedisticity and 
misspecification of model8.  
 
To examine the short run impact of independent variables including lagged error term ECM version of 
OLS is used. The results of short run model are reported in Table-4. The coefficient of lagged error 
term or 1−tECM  indicates the speed of adjustment from short run towards long run equilibrium path 
with negative sign. It is suggested by Bannerjee et al. (1998) that significance of lagged error term 
further validates the established long run relationship between the variables. Our empirical exercise 
indicates that coefficient of 1−tECM  is -0.6109 and significant at 1 percent level of significance. It 
implies a 61.09 percent of disequilibrium from the current year’s shock seems to converge back to the 
long run equilibrium in the next year.  
 
 
   
 26 
Table-4: Short Run Results 
Dependent Variable = tGln∆  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic 
Constant 0.0081 0.0074 1.0858 
tMln∆  0.0287 0.0110 2.6104** 
tKln∆  0.0543 0.0649 0.8375 
tTln∆  0.0947 0.0509 1.8562*** 
tRln∆  -0.0846 0.0363 -2.3315** 
1−tECM  -0.6109 0.1811 -3.3732* 
R-Squared = 0.4578 
Adjusted R-Squared = 0.3757 
Akaike info Criterion = -4.3838 
Schwarz Criterion = -4.1278 
F-Statistic = 5.5739* 
Durbin-Watson = 1.9303 
Diagnostic Tests  Statistics 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test 0.5529 (0.5808) 
ARCH LM test 0.0795 (0.7795) 
White Heteroscedisticity  0.3737 (0.8630) 
Ramsey RESET 0.8538 (0.3624) 
CUSUM Stable** 
CUSUMsq Stable** 
Note: *, ** and *** show significant at 1%, 5% and 10% 
level of significance. 
 
It is evident from Table 4 that in the short run economic growth is affected positively by defence 
spending, investment and trade openness and negatively by R hence it confirms out long run findings 
also. However, in this case positive impact of T is highest and then K and then comes the impact of M. 
This implies that in the short run T has the highest impact on the economic growth of Indian economy 
while in the long run impact of K is highest. This asserts that Indian policy makers might use policy of 
trade openness to boost economic growth particularly in the short run. However, long run policy of 
growth enhancement should be based on the development of investment sector. Hence, in budget 
allocations on priority might be given to investment sector over defence sector.  
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For the short run model, diagnostic tests also indicate that there is no evidence of serial correlation and 
error term is normally distributed. The autoregressive conditional heteroscedisticity and white 
heteroscedisticity are not found. Finally, short run model is well specified as confirmed by Ramsey 
RESET test. The stability of long run and short run estimates is tested by applying the cumulative sum 
(CUSUM) and the cumulative sum of squares (CUSUMSQ) tests. The results of CUSUM and 
CUSUMSQ reveal that both short run and long run estimates are stable and reliable. 
 
In the next step we analyzed the direction of causality using VECM (vector error correction method) 
framework. The presence of cointegrating among the variables leads us to perform the Granger 
causality test to provide a clearer picture for policymakers to formulate a comprehensive policy 
regarding defence and economic growth by understanding the direction of causality between the both 
variables. It is well documented that if there is long run relationship between the variables then there must 
be granger causality, at least from any direction. That's why after finding cointegration between the 
variables; we have used VECM granger causality to detect the direction of causality between defence 
spending and economic growth in the presence of investment, trade openness and interest rate. The 
detection of direction of causal relationship between the variables provides a clear picture for policymakers 
to formulate a comprehensive and sound economic policy to reduce military spending in sustaining 
economic growth. The results of our empirical exercise regarding causality are reported in Table-5. The 
causality relation can be divided into short- and long-runs causation as variables are cointegrated. The 
long run causality is indicated by the significance of coefficient of the one period lagged error-
correction term i.e. 1−tECM while short run causality can be detected by the joint significance of 
independent variables. The results show that military spending and economic growth granger-cause 
each other in short run as well in long run for the period of 1971-2010. 
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Table-5: Granger Causality Analysis 
Types of Granger Causality 
Short Run Long Run 
 
Dependant 
Variable ∑ −∆ itGln  ∑ −∆ itMln  ∑ −∆ itKln  ∑ −∆ itTln  ∑ −∆ itRln  1−tECM  
tGln∆  _____ 5.6645* [0.0088] 
1.3037 
[0.2881] 
5.9646* 
[0.0072] 
3.2230*** 
[0.0556] 
-0.6210 
[-3.1424]* 
tMln∆  3.8637** [0.0334] 
_____ 3.4680** 
[0.0457] 
4.7945** 
[0.0165] 
3.0216*** 
[0.654] 
-0.5002 
[-2.2246]** 
tKln∆  0.4374 [0.6501] 
0.6812 
[0.5145] 
_____ 0.4941 
[0.6155] 
2.9290*** 
[0.0712] 
-0.7408 
[-3.5556]* 
tTln∆  0.7702 [0.4728] 
3.0037*** 
[0.0664] 
4.7156** 
[0.0175] 
_____ 2.8502*** 
[0.0753] 
-0.0835 
[-0.7646] 
tRln∆  1.1595 [0.3288] 
0.3292 
[0.7223] 
0.1189 
[0.8883] 
4.7441** 
[0.0172] 
_____ -0.0807 
[-0.5415] 
Note: *, ** and *** show significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance. 
 
These findings are in line with the studies by Tahir (1995), Khilji and Mahmood (1997) and, Khan 
(2004) who reported bidirectional causality between the variables military spe2nding and economic 
growth in case of Pakistan. There is also bidirectional causality between economic growth and interest 
rate only long span of time but in short run, interest rate granger-causes economic growth. It is 
documented on basis of our findings that a rise in interest rate will granger-cause economic growth 
inversely through investment-declining effect while economic growth inversely granger causes interest 
rate through real money balances enhancing-effect. Further, we have evidence of bidirectional causal 
relationship between T and M, T and R, and unidirectional between T and K. This implies that defence 
expenditure provides peaceful environment for investment and production activities to foreign 
investors through trade openness and foreign investors provides advanced technology for investment in 
defence activities. Trade openness precedes interest rate and interest rate precedes trade openness i.e. 
trade openness decreases the rate of interest rate and low rate of interest is helpful in enhancing the 
trade openness. Further, trade openness is also found to be helpful in the encouraging domestic 
investment. 
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It is important to note that the F-test and t-test in VECM may be interpreted as within sample causality 
tests since they only indicate the Granger-exogenity or endogenity of the dependent variable within 
period under consideration (Tiwari and Tiwari 2010; Tiwari 2011). These tests do not provide 
information regarding the relative strength of the Granger causal chain amongst the variable beyond the 
period under study. Further, they do not provide the direction of the causal chain as they just show, in 
strict Granger sense, which variables precedes other (Tiwari 2009, 2011). In order to analyze the 
dynamic properties of the system the forecast error Variance Decompositions (VDs) and Impulse 
Response Functions (IRFs) are computed and results of VDs are reported in following Table-6 and 
IRFs are presented in appendix.  
 
Table-6: Variance Decomposition Approach 
 Variance Decomposition of tGln  
 Period S.E. tGln  tMln  tTln  tKln  tRln  
 1  0.0210  100.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 3  0.0357  45.4692  32.4393  18.2033  3.7919  0.0961 
 5  0.0496  38.2672  44.5886  13.6716  2.2635  1.2088 
 7  0.0648  33.8986  50.4905  12.4739  1.3279  1.8090 
 9  0.0813  32.5298  53.9054  10.5752  0.8463  2.1431 
 11  0.1001  31.8213  56.6976  8.58170  0.5693  2.3299 
 13  0.1219  31.4170  58.8506  6.82891  0.4295  2.4738 
 15  0.1474  31.1962  60.4554  5.3965  0.3845  2.5672 
 16  0.1617  31.1367  61.1015  4.7842  0.3836  2.5938 
 17  0.1772  31.0980  61.6670  4.2333  0.3924  2.6090 
 18 0.1941  31.0729  62.1633  3.7396  0.4091  2.6149 
 19  0.2123  31.0568  62.5984  3.2990  0.4322  2.6133 
 20  0.2321  31.0470  62.9789   2.9077  0.4605  2.6057 
 Variance Decomposition of tMln  
 Period S.E. tGln  tMln  tTln  tKln  tRln  
 1  2.8829  10.2713  89.7286  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 3  4.8162  23.6196  71.0273  1.5344  2.0469  1.7716 
 5  6.4521  26.1107  68.6706  0.8613  2.5823  1.7749 
 7  8.1395  28.3478  67.1730  0.5608  2.2433  1.6749 
 9  10.0315  29.3421  66.7105  0.3840  1.9483  1.6148 
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 11  12.1959  29.9264  66.3819  0.2616  1.8070  1.6228 
 13  14.6832  30.3380  66.1351  0.1815  1.7019  1.6433 
 15  17.5658  30.6396  65.9701  0.1304  1.5967  1.6629 
 16  19.1831  30.7519  65.9126  0.1126  1.5486  1.6741 
 17  20.9336  30.8435  65.8655  0.0989  1.5053  1.6865 
 18  22.8297  30.9189  65.8256  0.0887  1.4667  1.6999 
 19  24.8848  30.9815  65.7909  0.0813  1.4321  1.7140 
 20  27.1133  31.0340  65.7605  0.0764  1.4007  1.7281 
 Variance Decomposition of tTln  
 Period S.E. tGln  tMln  tTln  tKln  tRln  
 1  0.0654  0.0039  6.0063  93.9896  0.0000  0.0000 
 3  0.1456  0.4091  2.0298  96.4629  0.6335  0.4646 
 5  0.1874  1.1624  1.2758  90.8497  5.1900  1.5219 
 7  0.2163  1.8117  1.6181  84.8926  9.9581  1.7192 
 9  0.2433  2.8364  3.3863  82.0113  10.3826  1.3832 
 11  0.2727  4.3482  5.9218  78.9863  9.5797  1.1636 
 13  0.3039  6.3258  9.3300  74.3904  8.8452  1.1084 
 15  0.3383  8.6987  13.9422  68.1692  7.9608  1.2288 
 16  0.3576  10.0056  16.6514  64.5759  7.4123  1.3546 
 17  0.3786  11.3733  19.5549  60.7407  6.8169  1.5139 
 18  0.4017  12.7838  22.5945  56.7251  6.2011  1.6953 
 19  0.4270  14.2159  25.7183  52.5917  5.5861  1.8877 
 20  0.4548  15.6471  28.8778  48.4057  4.9872  2.0820 
Variance Decomposition of tKln  
 Period S.E. tGln  tMln  tTln  tKln  tRln  
 1  0.0366  0.0145  8.0966  1.5735  90.3153  0.0000 
 3  0.0471  0.4822  14.0444  18.7983  62.6659  4.0090 
 5  0.0611  2.1267  10.5648  47.2791  37.6226  2.4066 
 7  0.0712  3.8899  9.2596  54.7952  30.1091  1.9460 
 9  0.0797  5.8119  11.1129  54.4129  27.0683  1.5938 
 11  0.0895  8.0684  15.1639  52.7703  22.6246  1.3726 
 13  0.1011  10.7062  19.8760  49.8224  18.2129  1.3823 
 14  0.1076  12.1309  22.4460  47.6926  16.2942  1.4360 
 15  0.1146  13.5883  25.1908  45.1654  14.5389  1.5164 
 16  0.1223  15.0471  28.0838  42.3371  12.9080  1.6237 
 17  0.1307  16.4812  31.0607  39.3185  11.3844  1.7550 
 18  0.1401  17.8706  34.0432  36.2119  9.9710  1.9031 
 19  0.1504  19.2010  36.9625  33.1004  8.6778  2.0581 
 20  0.1618  20.4612  39.7691  30.0474  7.5118  2.2104 
Variance Decomposition of tRln  
 Period S.E. tGln  tMln  tTln  tKln  tRln  
 1  0.0743  1.1459  1.9237  12.7084  1.0128  83.2090 
 3  0.1194  0.5317  3.4961  37.0096  1.0784  57.8840 
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 5  0.1373  0.5482  2.8289  38.5509  1.9800  56.0919 
 7  0.1473  0.5287  3.0602  35.7505  3.6489  57.0115 
 9  0.1556  0.5418  3.8374  33.1039  3.6055  58.9112 
 11  0.1626  0.6067  4.5590  30.9948  3.3111  60.5281 
 13  0.1680  0.7115  5.2190  29.2038  3.1038  61.7617 
 15  0.1725  0.8332  5.9522  27.7158  2.9502  62.5483 
 16  0.1746  0.8993  6.3437  27.0967  2.8986  62.7615 
 17  0.1766  0.9694  6.7394  26.5635  2.8713  62.8562 
 18  0.1786  1.0436  7.1314  26.1200  2.8694  62.8353 
 19  0.1805  1.1216  7.5158  25.7703  2.8904  62.7017 
 20  0.1824  1.2025  7.8912  25.5166  2.9312  62.4583 
 
It is evident from Table-6 that in 20th year 62.98% of the variation in economic growth (G) is 
accounted by M (military expenditure) and 31% is accounted by variation in economic growth by 
itself. At the 20th year horizon, 65% of the uncertainty in M is accounted by itself and 31 % is 
accounted by economic growth. At the same time 48.40% of the variation in trade openness (T) is 
accounted by itself, 15.65% percentage by economic growth and 28.88% by M and 20.46%, 39.78% 
and 30.04% variation in investment (K) in the 20th year is accounted by G, M and T respectively. 
Further, 62.46% variation in the interest rate (R) at the 20th year is accounted by itself and 25.55% is 
accounted by trade openness (T). Though, the results show of VECM analysis reveals that military 
spending and economic growth granger-cause each other in short run as well in long run however, 
causality is stronger from military spending and economic growth than otherwise.  
 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The allocation of resources for defence purpose in developing economies and its impact on their 
economic growth has been studied by number of studies however, conclusion has been remain 
inconclusive so far. For the estimation purpose, various approaches based on classical, neoclassical and 
Keynesian framework were used to explore the nature of relationship between defence spending and 
economic growth. The present study is an attempt to re-investigate the effect of military spending on 
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economic growth using time series data over the period 1971-2010 in case of India. To test the 
stationary properties of the data we used unit root test which incorporates endogenously determined 
structural breaks in the series while ARDL bounds testing approach to cointegration is for relationship 
between military spending and economic growth.  
 
Study finds from unit root analysis that the variables have mixed order of integration. Further, the 
empirical exercise confirms the evidence of cointegration between economic growth, defence spending, 
investment, trade openness and interest rate. Results report that economic growth is positively affected 
by defence spending, investment and trade openness while negatively by interest rate. Further, higher 
defence spending is found to be having negative impact on the economic growth rate of Indian 
economy after a threshold point. 
 
Granger long run causality analysis reveals that any deviation from the cointegration will get corrected 
when economic growth, defence expenditure, and investment are the dependent variables as the error 
correction term is significant with negative sign when these variables are significant. This implies that 
if there is disequilibrium from the cointegration equation of the defence expenditure equation 
equilibrium will be stored with the speed of adjustment of 62.10% per annum. Short run Granger 
causality analysis reveals bidirectional causal relationship between military spending to economic 
growth, trade and defence spending and trade and interest rate and unidirectional causal relation 
between economic growth and interest rate and trade and investment. IRFs and VDs analysis also 
confirms the findings of short run analysis.  
 
   
 33 
Based upon these results we expect a higher economic growth rate in India if more public resources are 
diverted from the civilian sectors to defence of the economy now however, these expenditures must be 
up to a limit as if expenditure on defence activities crosses this limit it will have negative effect. 
However, expenditure in the capital sector (i.e., investment) has positive impact on the economic 
growth of India in the long run. This implies that Indian government must allocate major proportion of 
her budget in investment sector followed by defence sector and sooner or later she should reduce the 
expenses on defence sector. Therefore, keeping these points in mind Indian policy makers should 
allocate their budget expenses.   
 
Footnotes 
1. Alexander (1990) used a four sector Feder-Ram model for nine developed countries and found no 
effect of defense spending on economic growth. Huang and Mintz (1990) estimate a three sector 
Feder-Ram model using ridge regression techniques to overcome multicolinearity problems using 
annual data for the US for period 1952-1988. Their empirical exercise indicated no any relationship 
between defence spending and economic growth was found.  
2. Wilkins (2004) estimated pooled model explaining GDP growth as a function of labor, capital and 
defense spending for 85 countries. The defense spending has positive and significant effect for 39 
countries while negative and significant for eight countries and insignificant on economic growth 
for the remaining 38 countries. 
3. Chowdhury (1991) investigated the direction of causality between defence burden and economic 
growth for 55 LDCs. Results indicated a positive causal relation running from defence spending to 
economic growth for seven countries while negative causality for 15 countries and no causal 
relation was found for 30 countries, and bi-directional causality for three countries was found. 
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4. Guaresma and Reitschuler (2003) found that the partial correlation between defense spending and 
economic growth appears robust and significantly negative only for countries with a relatively low 
military expenditure ratio. 
5. The‘t-sig’ approach has been shown to produce test statistics which have better properties in terms 
of size and power than information-based methods such as the Akaike Information Criterion or 
Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (see  for example, Hall 1994, Ng and Perron, 1995). 
6. We used conventional level of significance that is 10% level of significance as a benchmark and 
fixed kmax= 12. 
7. Results of lag length selection test are presented in the appendix in Table-1. 
8. The long run estimates are stable because diagrams of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ are lying between 
critical bounds. 
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Appendix 
Table-1: Lag Order Selection 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -34.68258 NA   5.88e-06  2.1450  2.3626  2.2217 
1  177.8470   356.1307*  2.36e-10 -7.9917  -6.6855*  -7.5312* 
2  204.3231  37.2096   2.36e-10*  -8.0715* -5.6769 -7.2273 
3  224.1853  22.5462  3.85e-10 -7.7937 -4.3107 -6.5658 
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) 
 FPE: Final prediction error 
 AIC: Akaike information criterion 
 SC: Schwarz information criterion 
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure-1: Impulse Response Function 
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